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ABSTRACT. In a 2006 IPRS article, entitled Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish 
Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, Neal G. Jesse argues 
that Irish neutrality is best understood through a neoliberal rather than a 
neorealist IR theory framework. This article posits an alternative ‘critical 
social constructivist’ framework of understanding of Irish neutrality. The first 
part of the article considers the differences between neoliberalism and social 
constructivism and argues why critical social constructivism’s emphasis on 
beliefs, identity and the agency of the public in foreign policy are key factors 
explaining Irish neutrality today. Using public opinion data, the second part of 
the paper tests whether national identity, independence, ethnocentrism, 
attitudes to Northern Ireland and efficacy are factors driving public support for 
Irish neutrality. The results show that public attitudes to Irish neutrality are 
structured along the dimensions of independence and identity, indicating 
empirical support for a critical social constructivist framework understanding 
of Irish neutrality.  
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Stretching the IR theoretical spectrum of debate on Irish 
neutrality: arguments and evidence in favor of a critical social 
constructivist framework of understanding. 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Critical’ social constructivism promises a significant research agenda beyond 
that of its ‘conventional’ counterpart.  This article seeks to build upon Neal G. 
Jesse’s theoretical and empirical findings on Irish neutrality in his 2006 IPSR 
article entitled Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and 
Comparative Perspective and argues that critical social constructivism 
provides a more nuanced understanding of Irish neutrality than the neoliberal 
framework suggested in Neal G. Jesse’s article.  The differences between the 
‘neo-neo’ synthesis of realist and liberal theories and social constructivist 
theory1 are briefly explored after a fuller discussion of the differences within 
social constructivism(s) and how they relate to the central argument of this 
article. Critical social constructivism can be distinguished from conventional 
social constructivism (and neoliberalism) through its anti-essentialist ontology 
and qualified-foundationalist epistemology, the use of poststructuralist 
approaches and a concern with ‘omitted variable bias’ in mainstream IR 
theorizing, e.g. mass publics in terms of ‘levels-of-analysis’ and the 
consideration of ‘identity’ as a driver of foreign policy. These characteristics 
underpin the approach used in this article that supports alternative findings to 
the ‘neo-neo’ story of the drivers of Irish neutrality.  
 
The first half of this article evaluates the factors Jesse has identified as drivers 
of Irish neutrality that are understood as neoliberal, i.e. “public opinion, party 
politics, political institutions, leaders, and interest groups” (2006: 23) and cites 
a number of situations where the agency and identity of the public arguably 
provide a stronger impulse to the maintenance of Irish neutrality.  Jesse cites 
an examination of public concepts of neutrality in a discussion on the 
trajectory of the public’s view on continued neutrality (2006: 20).  The 
‘perspectivist’ element of critical social constructivism is employed in a re-
examination of this data; it suggests the literature has mis-interpreted public 
concepts of neutrality, possibly due to elite, neorealist biases.  The re-
evaluation shows that the public has a reasonably stable and coherent concept 
of neutrality; it is a more ‘active’ and broader concept than the Irish 
government’s realist concept that amounts to staying out of military alliances. 
These two important points have implications for the debate over the fit of a 
social constructivist approach with explanations of the maintenance of Irish 
neutrality.   
 
Jesse identifies the issues of independence and sovereignty (2006: 19, 20), the 
continuing separation of Northern Ireland (2006: 8) and anti-British sentiment 
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(2006: 21) as factors in Irish neutrality, and notes “that in no instance do the 
domestic sources consider the balance of power in the international 
environment to be a key to the neutrality policy” (2006: 23).  Thus, he argues 
that realism is not the basis of sub-state actors’ support for Irish neutrality and 
posits neoliberalism as an alternative framework of understanding.  However, 
Jesse also cites the illumination of a concept of “security identity” as a 
consequence of his research (2006: 24) and theorises it will contribute to the 
continuation of neutrality (2006: 25); this variable fits nicely into a critical 
social constructivist framework of understanding.   Using a recent Irish 
political attitudes survey, the second half of this article analyzes the results of 
a structural equation model that indicates which factors underpin public 
adherence to Irish neutrality.  The model incorporates the three issues 
identified by Jesse (with anti-British sentiment broadened to ethnocentrism), 
including constructivist ‘identity’ and realist ‘efficacy’. Critical social 
constructivism contributes to an understanding of the identity issue in Irish 
foreign policy and the unmediated role of the public in this realm of 
international relations, as the results confirm Jesse’s hypotheses of 
independence and identity as factors driving public support for Irish neutrality.   
 
IR theories and understandings of Irish neutrality 
 
Jesse concludes by calling for (1) “comparative studies to investigate and 
examine our long-held theories of international relations” and (2) ways to 
understand “a ‘security identity’ in Ireland that is tied to nationalism and 
independence from British hegemony” (2006: 24).  These are interdependent 
academic objectives because a critical review of long-held IR theories must be 
undertaken in order to understand the notion of identity as a dynamic of Irish 
neutrality.  The review must acknowledge that theories identify and prioritise 
the agents and variables considered in explanations and understandings of 
foreign policy.  The state-centric, materialist focus of neorealism, 
neoliberalism and ‘conventional’ social constructivism does not recognise the 
identity of the public as a dynamic of foreign policy; thus it is unlikely to be 
included in empirical FPA models.  Theories also guide discourses and 
conclusions on Irish neutrality.  For example, a deconstruction (see Devine, 
2006) demonstrated that two differing interpretations of Irish neutrality 
(including public opinion) are implicitly or explicitly underpinned by disparate 
sets of assumptions: a neorealist discourse concluded that Ireland is 
“unneutral” whilst a constructivist discourse that afforded agency to the public 
concluded otherwise.  This evidence drives the re-evaluation of the analysis of 
public concepts of Irish neutrality cited by Jesse (2006: 20), to check whether 
the dominance of elite realist conceptions of neutrality has obscured any non-
realist public perspectives on neutrality.  The re-examination could yield a 
clearer indication of the values underpinning the concept of neutrality 
supported by the Irish public.  This investigation is important because public 
opinion is one of the “internal forces” that Jesse identifies (2006: 20) as a 
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driver of Irish neutrality that is more powerful than neorealist “external” 
forces.  The nature and consistency of this internal force must be properly 
understood in order to explain why Irish neutrality persists over time, despite 
realist hypotheses (Everts, 2000: 179; Jesse: 2006: 23) of Irish neutrality’s 
demise in the post-Cold War era.   
 
IR theories and public opinion 
 
Realists like Hans Morgenthau ignored the public as a variable of foreign 
policy, believing the public to be ill-informed, inattentive and generally 
lacking the qualities needed to formulate ‘rational’ foreign policy preferences 
(Morgenthau, 1978: 558; Rosenau, 1961: 35; Althaus, 2003: 31). This Realist 
view was also held by public opinion analysts such as Gabriel Almond (1950) 
and Walter Lipmann (1955), who argued that public opinion threatens the 
normal course of rational foreign policy (Almond, 1960: 53, 69; Knopf, 1998: 
546; Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 504; Holsti, 1992: 442; Marquis et al., 1999: 
454).  Neither school took the process of opinion formation seriously (Marquis 
et al. 1999: 454) and their negative view of the public has since been refuted 
(Page and Barabas, 2000: 347; Isernia, 2001: 263).   
 
Empirical analyses have found  public opinion to be structured, ‘reflecting 
underlying values and beliefs’ (Holsti, 1996: 47; Page and Shapiro, 1992: 36; 
Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985: 872; Bardes and Oldendick, 1978: 497; Wittkopf, 
1990: 14, 21; Chittick et al., 1995; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1105; 
Sniderman, 1993: 228) and collectively rational (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 281; 
Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004: 291).  Normative democratic theory supports the 
view that citizens are a wise source of foreign policy, preventing foreign 
policy designed solely in the interests of elites and even restraining leaders’ 
war-making proclivities (Holsti, 1992: 440; Marquis et al., 1999: 454).  Gaps 
between the policy preferences of leaders and citizens are seen as problematic 
(Page and Barabas, 2000: 339) and reflecting different values and interests 
rather than levels of attention or information (Page and Barabas, 2000: 360).  
Where public opinion is structured and informed, democratic theory calls for 
responsiveness by policymakers (Page and Barabas, 2000: 352).  These points 
raise issues with the “Innenpolitik” and “Second Image” international relations 
literature.  The Innenpolitik debate centres on which aspect of the domestic 
structure matters most in determining a state’s response to international 
relations, e.g. pressure of the masses on policy, the autonomy of the state, etc.  
It is a focus on process and institutional arrangement that is divorced from 
politics (Gourevitch, 1978: 901 - 903).  The content of relations among groups 
and decisions is ignored, rather their formal properties or the character of 
decisions are considered: Waltz favors an emphasis on the “container”, rather 
than the “contents” (1959: 80) and with that, “somehow politics disappears” 
(Gourevitch, 1978: 901).   Critical social constructivism considers the content 
of what drives foreign policy preferences and unlike conventional social 
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constructivism, takes account of the politics involved in the construction of 
that content and its effect on policy.  
 
Studies have indicated a growing influence of public opinion on national 
policymakers, EU institutions and the course of European integration 
(Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993: 507-508; Anderson, 1998: 570).  A major re-
statement of neofunctionalist theory has explicitly assigned a substantial role 
to public opinion (Sinnott, 1995: 20, 23).  In short, the public and their 
opinions matter, despite mainstream theories’ practice of omitting this variable 
from the study of IR. 
 
Social Constructivism(s) 
 
Several types of social constructivisms have been identified, e.g. Maja Zehfuss 
(2002) identifies three types in a spectrum of work from Kratchowil to Wendt; 
Emanuel Adler (2002: 96) identifies four types: modernist, modernist 
linguistic, radical and critical; “there are many constructivists, and thus 
perhaps, many constructivisms” (Price, 2000: 1811).  The various approaches 
labelled social constructivism reflect different ontological and epistemological 
positions and are so ardently debated, “we still lack clarity on what 
constructivism is” (Zehfuss, 2002: 6).   
 
The origins and character of ‘critical’ social constructivism and its differences 
from conventional social constructivism are also disputed.  Many suggest the 
“critical strand of social constructivism” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 398) 
is derived from international “Critical Theory” associated with the work of 
Habermas and Foucault (Adler, 2002: 97) (although others argue that 
conventional constructivism also has its intellectual roots in critical theory 
(Farrell, 2002: 59)).  Ted Hopf outlines the similarities between conventional 
and critical constructivism, seeing both on the same side of Yosef Lapid’s 
Battle Zone barricades (1998: 181) and differentiates them thus: “to the degree 
that constructivism creates theoretical and epistemological distance between 
itself and its origins in critical theory, it becomes ‘conventional’ 
constructivism”.  Conventional constructivists like Alexander Wendt, Peter 
Katzenstein and Ronald Jepperson label critical constructivism “radical 
constructivism”, reflecting the work of David Campbell, Richard Ashley and 
Cynthia Weber.  Categorizations by mainstream IR theorists tend to miss the 
differences between postmodernist and poststructuralist work, e.g. John 
Mearsheimer lumps together the work of “constructivism, reflectivism, 
postmodernism and poststructuralism” (Hopf, 1998: 181; Farrell, 2002: 56).   
 
This problem of definition masks the underlying and more pressing issues that 
are revealed when distinguishing conventional from critical social 
constructivism through their respective research objectives, methods and 
output.  For example, Reus-Smit divides constructivism “between those who 
6 
 
remain cognisant of the critical origins and potentiality of their sociological 
explorations and those who have embraced constructivism simply as an 
explanatory or interpretive tool” (2001: 224).  The division is reflected in the 
assertion that critical social constructivists don’t build or test new causal 
theories (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 398).  Hopf designates the 
illumination of new understandings and the production of knowledge to the 
conventional realm of constructivism (1998: 185), implying that critical 
constructivist analyses of power relations and political constraints cannot do 
the same.    
 
These distinctions are unhelpful for illuminating the potential of critical social 
constructivism as research approach in IR and FPA – critical social 
constructivists can be both cognizant of their critical origins and use so-called 
“explanatory” or “theory-testing” research tools.  As Bill McSweeney argues, 
“To restrict the characterization of social theory to a choice over problem-
solving versus critical is unhelpful, since some analyses of the social and 
political order are uncritical in Cox’s sense of critical (being that critical 
theory “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that 
order came about”), and some problem-solving ones are critical” (1999: 112).  
Critical constructivists’ emancipatory analyses of power relations produce new 
knowledge that can be hypothesized and tested empirically. Empirical testing 
can elaborate intangible or omitted variables of power relations and ideational 
values in IR.  These possibilities are obscured by conventional understandings 
of what an emancipatory research approach produces and the dogged yet 
illogical disciplinary association of particular methods with essentialist 
ontology and foundationalist epistemology.   
 
Differences between conventional and critical social constructivism 
 
The main differences between conventional and critical social constructivisms 
of concern here are: (1) different understandings of identity and different 
emphasis on the role of domestic versus international factors in the production 
of that identity (Hopf, 1998: 183-185; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 399); (2) 
a concern on behalf of critical constructivism for missing variables and levels 
of analysis (Jacobsen, 2003: 59) and (3) different views on the acceptance and 
use of so-called ‘emancipatory’ or ‘dissenting’ traditions in constructivism 
(Houghton, 2007: 41; Farrell, 2002: 59; Checkel, 2004: 230).  These 
differences also illustrate the qualities of critical constructivism that enhance 
understandings of the dynamics of Irish neutrality compared with conventional 
constructivism or neoliberalism. 
   
Critical constructivists seek to understand the origins of identity; conventional 
constructivists assume state identity. (Zehfuss, 2002: 89) “For Wendt, a key 
distinction is between the corporate and social identity of states, with the 
former deemphasized because “its roots [are] in domestic politics”…the result 
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is that social construction at the level of individual agents or, more generally, 
at any domestic level is neglected”. (Checkel, 1998: 341) Critical 
constructivism is a preferred approach because it affords the public agency in 
the foreign policy process (McSweeney, 1985a: 202) and considers their 
identity as constituting Irish neutrality (McSweeney, 1985b: 118). This 
ontological position allows the critical distinction between governmental 
‘state/foreign policy’ identity and public ‘national/foreign policy’ identity to 
be made and facilitates consideration of the role of power and alienation in the 
construction of competing foreign policy identities.  In this paradigm, the 
exclusion of the public as a level of analysis in IR is political and a key point 
in attempts to understand the characteristics of Irish neutrality beyond those 
commonly identified in state and academic foreign policy discourses. 
 
Hopf suggests “perhaps where constructivism is most conventional is in the 
area of methodology and epistemology”; for example, he points to the authors 
of the theoretical introduction to The Culture of National Security who 
vigorously, and perhaps defensively, deny that their authors use “any special 
interpretivist methodology”. (1998: 182) Thus, “The concern of Wendt to 
avoid a break with the explanatory model of neorealism…has left its mark on 
the constructivist project” (McSweeney, 1999: 123).  Conventional or 
mainstream academics tend to reject analytical modes or forms of analysis that 
challenge the scholarly status quo (Jacobsen, 2003: 39) and it is argued that 
the positioning of conventional constructivism as the ‘middle ground’ of IR 
theory (Adler, 1997) excludes critical poststructuralist perspectives (Zehfuss 
2002: 260).  A growing number of academics (Larsen, 2004: 66-67; Zehfuss, 
2002; Checkel, 2004: 239) are advocating poststructuralist ‘methods’ as part 
of the social constructivist approach to IR and FPA.  This critical approach 
facilitates consideration of Irish national identity as a postcolonial 
phenomenon, which may explain why particular values are adhered to by the 
public and embodied in neutrality e.g. the values of non-aggression and anti-
imperialism that can lead to opposition to perceived ideological or resource 
wars waged by ‘great powers’.   
 
Choosing Frameworks: Neoliberalism vs Critical Social Constructivism 
 
The differences between critical and conventional constructivisms are similar 
to the differences between critical constructivism and the neoliberal paradigm. 
There are several reasons why critical constructivism is a better framework for 
understanding the internal dynamics of Irish neutrality rather than 
neoliberalism.  Constructivism argues that the study of international relations 
must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the international 
scene as well as the shared understandings between them (Jackson and 
Sørensen, 2006), directing analysis towards the consideration of public 
concepts of and attitudes towards neutrality, whereas neorealism considers 
only the governmental concept and policy (ignoring the sub-state level of the 
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public2) and neoliberalism only considers public opinion in so far as it 
influences government.  The latter paradigms reject the premise that the public 
has agency in international relations in and of itself, outside of the structural 
powers of the ‘intermediary’ of the government.  Empirical manifestations of 
this agency in the case of Irish foreign policy include voting in referendums, 
engaging in discourses through state and media channels and taking action, 
e.g. protest marches and bringing the state to court in support of neutrality.  
Although the effects of these public activities are difficult to isolate and 
measure, they can directly influence international politics, including 
institutions, peoples, governments and agencies in other states.   
 
Neoliberal institutionalism and conventional constructivism hold domestic 
politics constant and explore variance in the international arena (Gourevitch, 
2002: 309); this shared systemic theorizing flattens the role of domestic 
politics to zero in order to see whether changes in states’ environment alter 
their behavior.  This is also the central premise of realism: assuming a unitary, 
rational state in order to examine the variance within the international system.  
Conventional constructivists and neoliberals follow the neorealists in adopting 
a ‘third image’ perspective, focusing solely on interactions between unitary 
states.  Everything that exists or occurs within the domestic realm is ignored 
(Reus-Smit, 2001: 219).  As a result, the neo-neo theories and conventional 
constructivism are theoretically inadequate for understanding the dynamics of 
public agency and identity in the maintenance of Irish neutrality.  Thus, “we 
must venture outside of the orthodox” to analyse these variables because “the 
questions raised by our concern about identity, nationalism and the state 
cannot be responded to from within the current mainstream of IR theory”. 
(Tooze, 1996: xvi-xx)   
 
Neoliberal factors: governmental political institutions, interest groups, 
leaders and party politics 
 
Jesse argues that political parties, political institutions, leaders and interest 
groups are drivers of Irish neutrality rather than external factors such as the 
balance of power, therefore, neoliberalism is a superior framework to 
neorealism for understanding Irish neutrality.  Considering the relative 
strength of these internal factors vis-à-vis the agency of the public, does 
critical social constructivism provide a superior framework to neoliberalism?  
Firstly, some examples of the agency and behavior of these actors in situations 
where Irish neutrality was perceived to be at stake are examined.  Having 
established the relatively strong agency of the public, the second task is to 
look at whether the values, beliefs and identity of the public are significant 
drivers of their attitudes towards (and by extension their behaviour in support 
of) the maintenance of Irish neutrality.   
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Governmental decision-making political institutions and interest groups 
 
Political parties, governmental decision-making political institutions, leaders 
and a majority of interest groups supported a ‘yes’ vote in the European Union 
(EU) Nice Treaty referendum held in Ireland on 7th June 2001.  The 
referendum proposal was defeated, in part because the voters who turned out 
perceived threats to Irish neutrality arising from the Treaty (Sinnott, 2001: v).  
In response, the Irish government asked the EU Heads of State to declare that 
the Nice Treaty does not affect Irish ‘military’ neutrality, and the government 
added a protocol promising to hold a referendum on joining a European 
military alliance in the future.  In this instance, the public had a direct 
influence on international affairs in an attempt to maintain their conception of 
Irish neutrality, as the strength of public opinion forced neutrality onto the EU 
agenda, despite the efforts of well-funded pro-EU interest groups, employers 
groups, labour unions, major political parties and the government. Neoliberal’s 
hypothesis that these actors have a definitive influence in the maintenance of 
active neutrality is weaker than social constructivism’s hypothesis that the 
public has an equally significant role that is independent from these actors. 
 
Social constructivism’s emphasis on the level of cognition and ideas as the 
medium and propellant of social action (Adler, 2002: 325) and its goal of 
identifying the intersubjective context within which deeds of one kind or 
another appear to be reasonable and therefore justifiable (Kubálková, 2001: 
75) suggests the need to investigate governmental and public concepts of 
neutrality in order to explain the public’s behavior (as a reflection of their 
opinion on the maintenance of neutrality) vis-à-vis that of governmental and 
sub-state actors.  The ‘divergence of concepts’ hypothesis is alluded to in a 
broadsheet newspaper editorial noting that Ireland’s involvement in EU 
security and defence developments, such as participation in EU Battlegroups, 
does not affect the concept of neutrality “defined minimalistically by the 
Government as non-participation in military alliances” (Irish Times, 10th 
February 2006).   
 
Leaders 
 
The difficulty in isolating the effect of public opinion as a direct determinant 
of the foreign policy process is compounded in the Irish case with a lack of 
research (Keatinge, 1973: 184), nonetheless, it is possible to identify times 
when the Irish public constituency effectively controlled the capacity of Irish 
political leaders to participate in and influence international politics.  During 
the 1970s and 1980s, Irish Taoisigh avoided participating in European 
Community post-summit leaders’ discussions on the military aspects of 
European Political Cooperation because of public support for neutrality in 
Ireland.  For example, despite his own deeply-held personal convictions 
against Irish neutrality, the then Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, felt he had 
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to absent himself from such discussions due to pressure to uphold neutrality 
(FitzGerald, 1988: 29; Irish Times, 14-15 April 1995).  Furthermore, in the 
1990s, Irish political elites have claimed that the public would determine the 
‘pace and nature’ of further European integration (Mitchell in Sinnott, 1995: 
v)3 and successive governments have promised to leave the decision to 
abandon Irish neutrality and join an EU military alliance to the Irish people 
(Government of Ireland, 1996: 16; Seville Declaration 2002), effectively 
casting the public as decision-makers on this aspect of neutrality and 
international politics and absenting themselves from their position, as 
designated by Robert Putnam (1988), between international negotiation and 
domestic political forces.  This agency of the public reflects a social 
constructivist theoretical framework of understanding more than a neoliberal 
one.    
 
Party Politics 
 
Neoliberalism posits that party politics is a significant internal factor 
supporting Irish neutrality.  Consistency is held as an important basis of an 
actor’s power in the realm of foreign policy (Hill, 1992: 324-325).  Irish 
neutrality was argued to be at stake during the debate over Ireland’s 
membership of Partnership for Peace (PfP) between 1995 and 1999.  This era 
illustrates the questionable influence and consistency of party political actors, 
in particular, Fianna Fáil, the largest political party in the state that has held 
power for fifty-seven of the last 75 years, commanding the support of between 
four to five out of ten of the electorate, and claiming the title of ‘chief architect 
and defender of neutrality’ (Irish Times, 16th April 1997).   
 
Before assuming the role of Taoiseach in July 1997, party leader Mr. Bertie 
Ahern committed Fianna Fáil to holding a referendum on PfP membership 
(Fianna Fáil Election Manifesto, 1997).  Mr. Ahern conceived of Ireland’s 
membership of PfP as “seen by other countries as a gratuitous signal that 
Ireland is moving away from its neutrality and towards gradual incorporation 
into NATO and WEU in due course” and that any attempt to join without a 
referendum would be “a serious breach of faith and fundamentally 
undemocratic” (Irish Times, 29th March 1996).  Nonetheless, shortly after 
regaining office, on 5th October 1999 the Fianna Fáil-led Government 
implemented a decision to join PfP without a referendum, marking a U-turn in 
party’s position (Irish Times, 5 October 1999).  This example points to the 
inconsistency of the neutrality concept of the largest political party when in 
power (a limited/negative concept) and when in opposition (a 
comprehensive/positive concept) and raises the question of whether the 
government is less consistent than the public in its views on neutrality.  An 
analysis of public concepts of neutrality from 1985 through to 1992 cited by 
Jesse (2006: 20) argues that Irish public concepts of neutrality are 
‘inconsistent’ and ‘limited’, indicating there may be little to choose between 
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the public and governments on that score.  Attention now turns to the 
evaluation of this hypothesis. 
 
 
Re-analysing public concepts of Irish neutrality 
 
The critical element of constructivism demands cognisance of the theoretical 
assumptions underpinning academic analyses.  Knud Erik Jørgensen argues 
that the realism of many academics means that “much tends to remain 
unexamined because implicit assumptions and deeply held beliefs among 
analysts tend to replace analysis.  What is considered to be of minor or major 
importance tends to be identified ex post, rather than a priori and by means of 
theory-derived hypotheses” (1999: 113).  With respect to reporting on survey 
data, Ole Holsti and James Rosenau admit, “there are ways in which the 
patterns uncovered can be shaped by the premises and preconceptions of the 
researcher” (1986: 478).  There are three issues that hinder the analysis of 
public concepts of neutrality.  Firstly the majority of academic and 
government discourses on Irish neutrality define it narrowly as non-
participation in a military alliance.4  Government elites have also claimed that 
this narrow definition is the concept held by the Irish public (Minister for State 
Mr. Tom Kitt declared in the Dáil that “the central and defining characteristic 
of Irish people in this area…is our non-participation in military alliances” 
(Irish Times, 19th February 2003)). This dominant discourse may channel 
researchers’ perspectives to see this narrow concept rather than a broader, 
active concept of Irish neutrality.   
 
Two other difficulties contribute to differences in interpretations of the data.  
The 1985 and 1992 data used in Karin Gilland’s (2001) analysis were opinion 
polls undertaken on behalf of a newspaper and the responses to the open-
ended questions on the meaning of Irish neutrality had to be coded in a matter 
of hours.  The Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey (ISPAS) carried out 
in 2001/2002 presented the first academic opportunity to code verbatim 
responses to this question, with the benefit of a more favourable timescale.  In 
addition, the 1985 and 1992 surveys were based on a quota sample of the 
population, whereas the 2001/2002 ISPAS survey was based on a random 
sample of the electorate (those aged over eighteen and registered to vote).  The 
lack of academic access to the 1985 and 1992 verbatim responses and 
codeframes and the differing samples may contribute to a divergence in 
findings.  
 
“Inconsistent” and “limited”? 
 
There are two bases for an assumption of concept stability across the three 
decades of data collected on the meaning of Irish neutrality.  Recalling the 
premise that Irish foreign policy “is a statement of the kind of people we are,” 
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(Government of Ireland, 1996: 55), the first is that deeply-held personal values 
underpinning public concepts of neutrality and foreign policy identities are 
slow to change, in part because these values are a function of cultural and 
historical experience.  The second basis concerns the stability of state foreign 
policy activity: “One could argue for a greater stability of public opinion in 
countries where a relative exclusion from the vagaries and tensions of the 
international environment results in a less active foreign policy” (Isernia et al., 
2002: 204).  Ireland does not engage in wars, nuclear posturing, and other 
‘active’ variables identified by Isernia et al.; Ireland was not affected by an 
international upheaval (2002: 205) or major new events (2002: 216) in the 
time period preceding or during the conduct of the surveys.  Theoretically, 
therefore, one should not expect capricious change in public attitudes or 
concepts.     
 
Gilland characterises the public view of neutrality as inconsistent because “the 
response category ‘no military alliance, not in NATO’ lost 12 percentage 
points and went from 23 percent in 1985 to 11 percent in 1992” (2001: 150-
151).  The people “who associated it [neutrality] with military alliances” were 
outnumbered by those “who did not know what neutrality meant to them” 
(2001: 151).  A pluralist perspective of the original response category data in 
Table 1 (see http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/IOPA/) offers an alternative 
interpretation.  Gilland’s figure of 23 percent is derived from collapsing 
together two very distinct categories of meaning: 5 percent of respondents who 
said Irish neutrality means “not part of NATO” and 18 percent of respondents 
who said Irish neutrality means “no alliance with other nations/we don’t take 
sides”.  In the context of the ISPAS verbatims, these ‘no side taken/no alliance 
with other nations’ codes signify impartiality, i.e. not being seen to be allied 
with or supporting a nation at war.  The corresponding response category in 
the 1992 data that allegedly amounts to 11 percent is a total of 9 percent of 
respondents that said “we don’t take sides, no alliances” and 2 percent of 
respondents mentioning “we are not part of NATO”.   
 
TABLE 1 Original response category data ‘what does Irish neutrality mean to you?’ 
Survey: MRBI 22-23 April 1985 Survey: MRBI 8 June 1992 
Response category % Response category % 
We don’t get involved in wars  21 We don’t get involved in wars  35 
Should stay as we are  12 We should stay independent/as we 
are  
17 
No alliance with other 
nations/we don’t take sides  
18 No alliances, we don’t take sides  9 
Not part of NATO  5 We are not part of NATO 2 
A free/independent state  4 We are a free/independent country  8 
Don’t know  31 Don’t know  21 
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The breakdown5 of the 2001/2002 ISPAS data in Table 2 shows the most 
strongly-supported public concepts closely resemble the wider, ‘active’ 
concept of neutrality that embodies characteristics such as peace-promotion, 
non-aggression, the primacy of the UN and the confinement of state military 
activity to UN peacekeeping, not being involved in wars, and maintaining 
Ireland’s independence, identity and independent foreign policy decision-
making (in the context of ‘big power’ pressure).  Adding the 2001/2002 data 
code 18, “not involved in a defence alliance” to code 11, “no NATO 
involvement” gives a total figure of 1.4% for the super-category ‘not in a 
military alliance’.  This is roughly equivalent to the “not part of NATO” 1985 
and 1992 figures of 5 percent and 2 percent of the population, respectively.  
Impartiality-related codes in the 2001/2002 data include code 40, “no side 
taken in war/non-partisan” and code 26, “Ireland standing alone/minding own 
business”, accounting for 6% of mentions (including code 2, “being neutral 
[between aggressors]” brings total impartiality sentiment to 11%).   
 
TABLE 2 ISPAS 2001/2002 selected response category data for the question 
‘what does Irish neutrality mean to you?’ 
 
Code N= Definition of Irish Neutrality (first mentions) % 
13 24 Peaceful/promotes peace/mediator 1.0 
21/23 67 No enemies/free from war/conscription 2.7 
4 123 Good thing 4.9 
19 47 Important/means a lot 1.9 
8 143 Not involved in other countries’ war 5.7 
5 366 Not involved in war/no war 14.6 
2 120 Being neutral 4.8 
14/15 71 UN involvement/ peacekeeping only 2.9 
7 119 Independence/make own decisions 4.7 
26 93 Ireland standing alone/minding own business 3.7 
10 21 Irish Identity 0.8 
31 186 No opinion 7.4 
40 61 No side taken in war/non-partisan 2.4 
0 151 Don’t know 6.0 
57 96 Right to decide to go to war 3.8 
18 25 Not in defence alliance* 1.0 
39 4 Military neutrality 0.2 
11 9 No NATO involvement* 0.4 
1 140 Nothing 5.6 
29 15 Disagree with it 0.6 
3 17 Fence-sitting 0.7 
----- 614 Other 24.4 
Total 
 
2512 
 100 
*government definition. 
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In Gilland’s analysis, themes relating to non-partisanship/impartiality were 
coded into the categories “no alliances, we don’t take sides” and “no alliance 
with other nations/we don’t take sides” and subsequently written up as part of 
a super-category labelled ‘membership of a military alliance’.  Creating a 
“military alliance” super-category from the two “no alliance with other 
nations/we don’t take sides” and “not part of NATO” codes effectively 
quadruples the number people alleged to associate Irish neutrality with 
military alliances, but the two response categories are arguably too distinct in 
meaning to be collapsed together.  Having the membership of military alliance 
meaning (that has significantly less mentions than the impartiality codes) take 
precedence in the written presentation of these collapsed response categories is 
misleading, to the extent that elements of public concepts of neutrality are at 
best ignored and at worst, are subsumed into a limited, realist concept of 
neutrality.  If the above arguments are accepted, Gilland’s claim that the 
meaning of Irish neutrality that is “associated with military alliances” has 
dropped from 25 percent to 11 percent between the 1985 and 1992 surveys 
cannot be sustained; the difference is between the 1985 figure of 5 percent and 
the 1992 figure of 2 percent, amounting to just 3 percent and as a result, the 
“inconsistency” claim (2001: 150) regarding public concepts of Irish neutrality 
is not sustained.  In fact, significant elements of the public concepts of 
neutrality, such as the sovereignty and independence variables Jesse identifies 
as catalyzing Irish neutrality, are consistent over time.  Table 3 shows the rank 
order6 of the response categories and points to reasonable stability in the range 
of meanings of public concepts of Irish neutrality: the top four definitions of 
neutrality are ‘not getting involved in war’, ‘independence/staying 
independent’ and ‘not taking sides [in wars]/impartiality’ and ‘not 
possible/means nothing’ (MRBI April 1985; MRBI May 1992; MRBI June 
1992, ISPAS 2001/2002).     
 
TABLE 3 Rank order of neutrality definitions offered by the Irish public, 1985-2001 
 RANK ORDER 
Survey responses April 
1985 
May 
1992 
June 
1992 
2001/ 
2002 
Don’t get involved in wars 2 1 1 1 
Don’t know 1 2 2 2 
Independence/staying independent 4 3 3 3 
Don’t take sides in wars/non-partisan/neutral 3 5 4 6 
Means nothing/not possible 8 4 6 4 
  
Staying out of NATO/military alliances 5% 2% 2% 1% 
Don’t know 31% 25% 21% 16% 
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The most frequently mentioned meaning, “don’t get involved in wars” 
correlates strongly with academic concepts of neutrality.  For example, Jessup 
claims, “the primary objective of a neutrality policy should be to keep out of 
war” (1936: 156); for Goetschel, “being neutral means not taking part in 
military conflict” (1999: 119) and according to Calvocoressi, “neutrality was a 
general declaration of intent to remain out of any war which might occur” 
(1996: 172).  The second and third most popular public concepts, 
“independence/staying as we are” and “not taking sides”, are methods to 
achieve the objective of staying out of wars and constitute important elements 
of neutrality.   
  
Linking values and identity of the public in foreign policy 
 
Understanding the public’s concept of neutrality is central to explaining the 
role of identity as a driver of public opinion because there is theoretical and 
empirical evidence favoring the hypothesis of a relationship between the 
values embodied in the strongly-supported public concept of Irish neutrality 
and the national identity of the Irish people portrayed internationally.  In 
Ireland’s first and only White Paper on Foreign Policy, the Irish Government 
acknowledged that “Ireland’s foreign policy is about much more than self 
interest. For many of us it is a statement of the kind of people we are” (Ireland, 
1996: 55) and that “the majority of the Irish people have always cherished 
Ireland’s military neutrality, and recognise the positive values that inspire it, in 
peace-time as well as time of war” (Ireland, 1996: 15).  The Paper states, “the 
values that underlie Ireland’s policy of neutrality have therefore informed 
almost every aspect of our foreign policy” (Ireland, 1996: 119) and cites an 
example of this using impartiality, an important element of the public concept 
of neutrality: “our international reputation for impartiality has enabled us to 
play a meaningful role in the preservation of peace in the world” (Ireland, 
1996: 119).   
 
Theorists have argued that national interest depends on national identity, 
which is a construct in our minds describing and prescribing what we should 
think, feel, value and ultimately behave in group-relevant situations.  This 
identity has an internal (how groups imagine themselves) and external 
dimension and is a function of values.  (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 95) 
Values and identity are interlinked, as Poole argues, “an identity is a form of 
inscription: as such, it embodies a specific evaluative point of view. All 
identities involve values and commitment, and the acquisition of identity 
means coming to accept these values and commitments” (1999: 46).   In effect, 
the concept of Irish neutrality as understood by the Irish people is a reflection 
of their values and a projection of their national identity in international 
affairs.  Ireland is not a unique case in this respect, as this phenomenon is 
identified as a dynamic in other European neutral states populations7 and also 
in alliance states8.  This theoretical move reflects the social constructivist 
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emphasis on identity as a driver of foreign policy: this understanding of Irish 
neutrality will be evaluated in the next half of this article.   
 
Evaluating the drivers of public opinion on neutrality 
 
Before discussing the results of the structural equation model, it is worth 
noting the issues raised by the use of statistical models within the critical 
strand of social constructivism.  Because constructivist scholarship has taken 
on the metatheoretical challenges issued during The Third Debate (Price, 
2000: 1786), some critical constructivists have been associated with 
poststructuralist approaches and work within the school of Critical Theory.  As 
regards testing theoretical hypotheses empirically, just as poststructuralist 
deconstruction is not anti-empirical (Der Derian, 1997: 57), neither is critical 
social constructivism – it has a qualified foundationalist approach to the 
empirical, acknowledging the shifting notion of ‘reality’ and the politicisation 
of identifying what is ‘real’ and what is possible.  This foundationalism, in a 
Derridian sense, rejects the notion of a value-neutral reality (Zehfuss, 2002: 
207).9  There is a need to emphasize the fact that using statistical methods to 
evaluate data capturing political concepts does not render the concepts 
epistemologically incontestable (Jupille, 2005: 216).  The structural equation 
model technique employed in this article uses a number of different but related 
statements to measure the values that are hypothesised to drive attitudes to 
neutrality; these multiple indicators are translated into an operationalized 
latent variable that is interpreted as an orientation.  Theoretically, this is a less 
essentialized operationalisation than other techniques such as multiple 
regression analysis that use one single measurement to represent a variable.  
The meaning is a little more open to interpretation – although hardcore 
positivists might see this as merely introducing more error.  Whilst the 
language used is different to that of the interpretative camp of critical 
constructivism, nevertheless, the findings are important to understand as they 
build on the results of prior interpretative analyses.  This cognitive empirical 
approach to understanding neutrality fits into the concept of social 
constructivism as a substantive theory of politics: “The cognitivists, especially 
in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), are told that their studies…are a coherent 
constructivist approach (ISA Panel 1995)”. (Wæver, 1997: 23-24)   
 
Variables and Hypotheses 
 
Jesse identifies factors such as hostile relations with Britain, the continuing 
separation of Northern Ireland and notions of independence and sovereignty as 
drivers of Irish neutrality (2006: 8).  There is plenty of support in the literature 
for the independence (Fanning, 1996: 14; Fisk, 1983: 39; Keatinge, 1984: 
108), anti-British sentiment (Andrén, 1978: 174; Fanning, 1996: 145; Fisk, 
1983: 76; Keatinge, 1989: 68; Kux, 1986: 36; Sundelius, 1987: 8) and 
Northern Ireland hypotheses (Karsh, 1988: 192; Keatinge, 1978: 112; Salmon, 
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1982: 205; Sundelius, 1987: 8).  In this model, an “ethnocentrism” latent 
variable is substituted for anti-British sentiment due to data limitations.  In 
addition to these factors, the literature supports testing the notions of 
patriotism/identity, (Fanning, 1996: 146; Keatinge, 1984: 6-7; McSweeney, 
1985b: 119) and efficacy (Keatinge, 1978: 93) as drivers of neutrality, 
associated with social constructivist and realist dimensions of neutrality, 
respectively.  The dependent latent variable comprising a zero to ten-point 
scale captures whether Ireland must remain neutral in all circumstances or give 
up its neutrality and whether neutrality is not at all important or very 
important.  The data is derived from the ISPAS survey carried out during the 
winter of 2001 and spring of 2002, based on a random sample of the electorate 
(those aged over eighteen and registered to vote). 
 
National identity/Patriotism 
 
William Chittick has been trying to get the academic community to accept an 
identity dimension in models of public opinion on foreign policy (POFP) since 
the mid-1980s (Hart, 1995).  Part of the difficulty is probably due to the lack 
of a theoretical framework supporting the introduction of an identity 
dimension.  Although many POFP analysts have linked dimensions to 
“venerable IR theories of realism and liberalism” (Bjereld and Ekengren, 
1999: 515), to date, social constructivism has not featured in the POFP 
literature as a suitable theoretical avenue, probably because it only became 
influential as a tradition in IR in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Weber, 2001: 
60), compounded by the fact that “IR constructivism is at a preliminary stage 
only; much work still remains before it becomes a normal and taken-for-
granted way of doing IR theory and research” (Adler, 2002: 111).  Outside of 
the POFP literature, the relationship between neutrality and national identity 
has been identified by Irish history and politics academics, e.g. Ronan Fanning 
notes that, “no Irish government would be so foolhardy as to underestimate the 
fierce hold on the popular imagination of the historic bond between Irish 
neutrality and Irish identity”. (1996: 146)   This literature, combined with the 
theoretical reasons discussed earlier, supports the proposed hypothesis that 
attachment to Irish national identity is related to attachment to neutrality.10 
 
Notably, identity is a factor in analyses of European neutrality, i.e. Sweden, 
Switzerland, Austria and Finland.  In the Swedish case, Annical Kronsell and 
Erika Svedberg (2001: 154) argue that: “A collective identity was shaped by 
the neutrality doctrine…the neutrality doctrine can be seen as ‘the state’s 
external projection of itself into the world’ (Wæver, forthcoming)”.  Ann-
Sofie Dahl claims “it is important to understand the position which neutrality 
has occupied generally in Swedish society. Neutrality evolved over the years 
from merely the security doctrine of the country to become a central tenet of 
Swedish national identity. (1997: 19-22) The former President of the Swiss 
Confederation, Max Petitpierre argued that Swiss “neutrality’s justification 
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does not lie in foreign opinion, even though this is important to us and we 
must seek to inform it and influence it.  Justification lies above all in our own 
conviction that in breaking away from neutrality we would lose our national 
character” (Ogley, 1970: 180).  Furthermore, Jean Freymond explains that 
“neutrality became and remains the guiding principle of Swiss foreign policy, 
not only in the eyes of the authorities, but even more for public opinion, to the 
extent that it has become one of the components of Swiss identity”. (1990: 
181)  Analysing Austrian neutrality, Hans Thalberg surmised that, “neutrality 
has to reflect the general character and temperament of a nation” (1989: 236).  
In a discussion of Finnish neutrality, Pertti Joenniemi argues that “neutrality is 
not only a role or status; it also connotes a more general foreign-policy profile 
or identity”. (1989: 58)   
 
TABLE 4. Patriotism Indicators 
Variable Label Question Wording Scale 
citizen I would rather be a citizen of Ireland than of any other 
country in the world 
1 – 7  
proud Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not 
very proud or not at all proud to be Irish? 
1 – 4   
import’nt Overall, how important is it to you that you are ‘Irish’ or 
[other nationality] 
1 – 4  
 
 
Independence/sovereignty 
 
The modern history and politics literatures on Irish neutrality posit 
independence and sovereignty as key factors underpinning Ireland’s neutrality; 
the former also makes explicit reference to public attitudes in this respect.  
Robert Fisk dubbed Ireland’s neutrality in the Second World War, “a publicly 
non-aligned independence that finally demonstrated the sovereignty of de 
Valera’s state and her break with the Empire”. (Fisk, 1983: 39)  (See also 
Fanning (1996: 139)  Vukadinovic (1989: 41-42) and Karsh (1988: 192)).  
Patrick Keatinge notes a “psychological need” in Irish people “for a dramatic 
manifestation of independence”, a factor, he argues, that underpinned people’s 
reluctance to question the doctrine of neutrality. (1978: 73)  Due to the strong 
association of neutrality with independence, it is hypothesised that 
independence should be a significant factor structuring attitudes to Irish 
neutrality - the more an individual favours Irish independence, the more that 
person should favour the maintenance of Irish neutrality.11  
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TABLE 5. Independence Indicators 
Variable Label Question Wording Scale 
EU unifica European Unification has gone too far -> not far enough 0 – 10  
Unite/Indep Ireland should do all it can to unite fully with the EU -> 
protect independence 
0 – 10  
EU memb Ireland’s membership of the European Union is a bad 
thing -> a good thing 
0 – 10  
Nice I I would like you to imagine you are voting on the next 
referendum on the Nice Treaty [Nice II]. Where would 
you place yourself on a scale of 1 to 7? [1 -> definitely 
in favour; 7 -> definitely against] 
1 – 7  
 
 
Northern Ireland 
 
The comparative literature cites Northern Ireland as an important dynamic of 
Irish neutrality; e.g. Bengt Sundelius declares Irish neutrality “is intimately 
linked to the unsettled question of Northern Ireland” (1987: 8) and Keatinge 
posits Irish neutrality as “a symbol of two of the most emotionally charged 
Irish national aspirations”, independence and unification of the island (1972: 
439). Efraim Karsh argues “neutrality has been both a product of the painful 
question of Partition and a means for its solution”. (1988: 192)  Many 
academics recall the British government’s attempts to involve Ireland in the 
Second World War by floating re-unification proposals (Keatinge, 1978: 110-
111), which Eamon de Valera consistently refused.  Although Róisín Doherty 
acknowledges that “partition was not the primary motivation for neutrality, 
sovereignty was more important to de Valera”, she maintains that “the 
impression among the general public was different”. (2002: 41)   As academic 
discussions of the links between Northern Ireland and neutrality refer only to 
the level of statesmanship and there has been no convincing evidence that the 
issue embedded itself in the public mind, it is hypothesised that attitudes to the 
Northern Ireland question should have little bearing on attitudes to Irish 
neutrality. 
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TABLE 6. Northern Ireland Indicators 
Variable Label Question Wording Scale 
united/sep It is essential that all of Ireland becomes united in one 
state-> the different parts of Ireland are best left as 
separate states 
0 – 10  
reunify The long term policy for Northern Ireland should be to 
reunify with the rest of Ireland [disagree -> agree] 
1 – 7   
Brit say The British government should continue to have a lot of 
say in the way Northern Ireland is run [disagree -> 
agree] 
1 – 7   
withdraw The British government should declare its intention to 
withdraw from Northern Ireland at a fixed date in the 
future [disagree -> agree] 
1 – 7  
 
 
Ethnocentrism 
 
With only one indicator to estimate an anti-British latent construct, a wider 
theoretical perspective was taken in relation to this issue: rather than focus on 
one specific “outgroup”, such as “the British” or the “English”, an 
international and widely used “ethnocentrism” latent orientation is employed 
in the model.  Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (1987: 1108) define 
ethnocentrism as “the belief that one’s country is superior to all others” and 
make a link between ethnocentrism’s fostering of a self-centred and parochial 
view of the world and a tendency towards isolationism.  Peter Schmidt and 
Aribert Heyder (2000) identify two dimensions of ethnocentrism: a 
phenomenon of cultural narrowness and the over-evaluation or idealization of 
the ingroup.  The cultural effect of Ireland’s postcolonial legacy and the 
notable persistence of a self-critical discourse in the media indicate the small 
likelihood of “national superiority” and “blind nationalist” tendencies among 
the Irish population; that said, several realist academics (Doherty, 2002: 30; 
Fanning, 1996: 142-143; FitzGerald, 1995; Salmon, 1989) who maintain that 
Irish neutrality is a myth have alleged pietistic inclinations among some 
neutrality supporters, emboldened by an image of neutrality as a morally 
superior foreign policy option.  As realist thinking drives the hypothesized 
link, ethnocentrism is not expected to be a significant dynamic of Irish public 
opinion on neutrality. 
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TABLE 7. Ethnocentrism Indicators 
Variable Label Question Wording Scale 
interests Ireland should always follow its own interests, even if 
this leads to conflicts with other nations 
1– 7 
support Irish people should support their country even when it is 
wrong 
1 – 7   
Ire better Generally speaking, Ireland is a better country than most 
countries 
1 – 7   
like Irish The world would be a better place if people from other 
countries were more like the Irish 
1 – 7  
 
 
Efficacy 
 
Another dynamic of neutrality that frequently appears in the foreign policy 
literature is the realist notion of efficacy, reflecting perceived levels of power.  
Neutrality violates the realist power assumption because “neutrality is the 
opposite of a typical policy followed by a small state”. (Karsh, 1988: 4)  The 
neorealist paradigm expects “small” states to seek security with other states in 
a military alliance because their low levels of efficacy hamper survival in an 
anarchic world.  The Irish government believes that “Ireland is a small country 
with a limited capacity to influence its external environment” (Ireland, 2000: 
3.2.1) and the public may share this view.  The efficacy latent variable in this 
model comprises a personal concept of efficacy (defined as “the feeling that 
individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political 
process” (Acock, Clarke and Stewart, 1985: 1063)), a measure concerning the 
government’s ability to influence factors affecting Ireland given the pressure 
of external factors and a third concerning the influence of political parties.  
Given the link between neutrality and efficacy is a realist-based “costs and 
benefits” hypothesis existing at the state-government level, it is hypothesized 
that efficacy is not a significant determinant of attitudes to neutrality.   
 
TABLE 8. Efficacy Indicators 
Variable Label Question Wording Scale 
govt In today’s world, an Irish government can’t really 
influence what happens in this country. [Disagree-
Agree] 
1– 7 
person The ordinary person has no influence on politics.  
[Disagree-Agree] 
1 – 7   
party It doesn’t really matter which political party is in power, 
in the end things go on much the same. [Disagree-
Agree] 
1 – 7   
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The evaluation of the measurement model concerns the extent to which the 
observed variables are actually measuring the hypothesized latent variables. 
The relationship between the observed variables and the latent variables are 
indicated by the factor loadings.  Factor loadings are interpreted as 
unstandardized regression coefficients that estimate the direct effects of the 
factors on the indicators (Kline, 1998: 207); they indicate expected change in 
the indicator given a 1-point increase in the factor (Kline, 1998: 215).  In this 
model (n=1855), all of the unstandardized loadings that are not fixed to 1.0 to 
scale factors, are significant at the .01 level and all of the error variances are 
different from zero and significant at the .01 level. Overall, the measurement 
model appears to perform well, helped by the fact that each latent variable is 
represented by at least three indicators that are psychometrically sound. 
 
The evaluation of the structural model concerns the relationship between the 
neutrality, independence, patriotism, efficacy, ethnocentrism and Northern 
Ireland latent variables. The statistical significance of parameter estimates 
(magnitude) and the direction (positive or negative coefficients) are required 
to provide a meaningful interpretation of the results. The use of a correlation 
matrix results in more conservative estimates of parameter statistical 
significance (Kelloway, 1998: 19).  Another important measure is the 
assessment of the ‘fit’ of the data to the model, specifically, the comparative 
fit of the default model to the data vis-à-vis the null model (Kelloway, 1998: 
29).  The goodness-of-fit statistics that evaluate the overall fit of the model are 
included. The rmsea figure should be above .04 and the pclose should 
approximate 1.00. 
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FIGURE  1. The Structural Equation Model of Public Opinion  
0
Neutrality
3.46
attitude
0, 1.89
e1
1.00
6.60
salience
0, 4.63
e2
-.66
1
0, .35
Ethnocentrism
3.12
wrong
0, 2.21
e8
4.42
interests
0, 3.03
e7
1.37 1.13
0, 1.70
Independence
3.89
Nice I
0, 3.47
e6
-.79
7.95
EU memb
0, 4.04
e5
4.67
Unite/Indep
0, 7.14
e4
5.75
EU unifica
0, 4.73
e3
3.52
like Irish
0, 2.11
e10
5.22
Ire better
0, 1.58
e9
0, 1.70
Northern Ireland
4.62
withdraw
0, 1.84
e17
3.32
Brit say
0, 2.18
e16
4.95
reunify
0, .95
e15
4.38
united/sep
0, 7.33
e14
1
1
1
-1.43
0, .32
Patriotism
1.43
import'nt
0, .21
e13
.81
1
1.56
proud
0, .30
e12
1
5.71
citizen
0, 1.40
e11
1
0, 1.47
Efficacy
4.89
party
0, 2.40
e26
4.33
person
0, 2.14
e25
3.29
Govt
0, 2.11
e24
.65
11
.73
1
-.15
.80
Unstandardized estimates
chi-square=681.508 df=160 p-value=.000
gfi=\gfi agfi=\agfi rmsea=.042 pclose=1.000
0, 4.50
res1
1
1 11 1
1
1
-.01
.04
Irish Literature Model
1
.60
1.00
.76
-1.32
1.00
1
1.00 1.08
1.00
-1.26
-.49
11
1.001.69
-.20
.32
-.56
-.45
-.42
 
 
 
 
 
Unstandardized estimates 
chi-square=681.508 df=160 p-value=.000 
rmsea=.042 pclose=1.00 
 
 
24 
 
Looking at the regression weights of the five latent variables shown in Table 
9, only the two hypothesized determinants of public support for Irish 
neutrality, independence and patriotism, show statistically significant 
parameter estimates and positive relationships (.6 and .8 respectively) with the 
neutrality latent variable.  In comparison, the efficacy (.04), Northern Ireland 
(-.01) and ethnocentrism (-.15) parameters are weak and are not statistically 
significant.  Many public opinion researchers connect these types of “domain 
beliefs to international relations theory – realism and idealism (Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1987, 1990; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Wittkopf 1990, 1994; 
Maggiotto 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Russett, 
Hartley, and Murray 1994; Holsti 1996; Murray, Cowden and Russett 1999; 
Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Page and Barabas 2000)” (Jenkins-
Smith, 2004: 291).  The relative strength of the independence and patriotism 
factors in the model confirms the importance of these two drivers in the 
maintenance of Irish neutrality and the theoretical relevance of the social 
constructivist framework that considers the identity factor in foreign policy 
analysis.  Jesse calls for ways to understand both sovereignty and identity as 
two central dynamics of Irish neutrality: arguably, there is a dynamic of 
interdependence between these two factors (see Keatinge (1984: 6-7) and 
Fanning (1996: 137) who theorise interaction at the level of the state).  
Fanning (1996: 140) sees the interplay at work at the level of the public: “by 
the end of the Second World War neutrality had become what it largely 
remains in the popular mind until today: the hallmark of independence, a 
badge of patriotic honour inextricably linked with the popular perception of 
Irish national identity”.  The relationship between independence and 
patriotism is symbiotic. 
 
TABLE 9. Regression Weights of the  Structural Model 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variables Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Neutrality <--- Ethnocentrism -.146 .199 -.734 .463 
Neutrality <--- Patriotism .795 .192 4.137 *** 
Neutrality <--- Northern Ireland -.014 .052 -.265 .791 
Neutrality <--- Independence .600 .073 8.200 *** 
Neutrality <--- Efficacy .037 .074 .503 .615 
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Conclusions 
 
For Jesse (2006: 8) “it is obvious that realist theory grossly underestimates the 
contributions of domestic factors to the establishment and maintenance of Irish 
neutrality”.  Neoliberalism is not the best alternative framework because it 
accords public opinion agency in foreign policy only through governments; as 
the Irish government’s concept of neutrality does not reflect or capture public 
concepts of neutrality, government, in this case, is an unlikely representative 
intermediary.  Jesse’s argument that the development of a security identity that 
is tied to nationalism and independence contributes to the continuation of 
neutrality (2006: 23, 25) is supported, but is inconsistent with claims that 
liberal theories give a better understanding of continued Irish neutrality (2006: 
23) because identity and independence are the drivers underpinning the agency 
of the Irish public in maintaining Irish neutrality and liberal theories, unlike 
critical constructivism, do not seriously consider identity as a variable in state 
foreign policy or as a driver of public support for foreign policy.  This 
identity-based neutrality dynamic suggests there will be stability in the Irish 
population’s support for Irish neutrality, as radical short-term change in the 
identity (and values) of mass publics is rare.  This has implications for the 
future referendum on Irish neutrality in the context of governments’ agreement 
to create a European Union military alliance. 
 
David Dessler (1999: 123) has speculated on the contribution of 
constructivism to FPA and IR, asking whether constructivists would introduce 
new methods and new epistemological standards to empirical enquiry.  The 
employment of a critical perspectivist approach to the analysis of public 
concepts of neutrality in this article has contributed to this task, demonstrating 
that the study of neutrality as a phenomenon of IR and FPA required “new 
forms of theoretical and historical analysis”. (Dessler, 1999: 123)  Dessler also 
asked whether constructivism would turn attention to long-ignored causal 
factors and effects in world politics; the validation of a critical constructivist 
decision to include an identity variable in the analysis of the drivers of public 
attitudes to neutrality points to a long ignored causal factor of foreign policy 
that deserves further empirical attention.   
 
Liberals like Andrew Moravscik (1997) want a synthesis of liberal and 
constructivist theory, the conventional constructivist Alexander Wendt (1992: 
425) wants strong liberals and constructivists to engage, and a sympathetic 
critical constructivist wants “a serious dialogue by both mainstream scholars 
and conventional constructivists with critical constructivists” (Jacobsen, 2003: 
60).  Others want constructivism to build bridges with particular sub-
disciplines: Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 396) see constructivism building 
bridges with comparative politics and David Patrick Houghton (2007: 33, 42) 
advocates bridges with comparative FPA.  Whilst the constructivist project has 
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sought to open up the relatively narrow theoretical fields in IR (Ruggie, 1998: 
862), given its concerns with emancipation, methodological plurality, and the 
origins, nature and politics of identity, arguably the critical strand of 
constructivism is better equipped to achieve that goal than conventional 
constructivism.  Critical social constructivism should collaborate with the sub-
discipline of public opinion and foreign policy (POFP) to further theorize the 
mass public as an agent in FPA and IR.   
 
 
Notes 
 
1
 Strictly speaking, neorealism is classified as a “theory” by its adherents, although 
sympathetic critics have argued for neorealism to be understood as a philosophical orientation 
or a research programme (Donnelly, 2000: 75) rather than a theory defined by an explicit set 
of assumptions (Donnelly, 2000: 6).  Kenneth Waltz’s employment of “theory” as the term for 
neorealism (1995: 71) indicates a hierarchy of variables and the notion of rigour and 
regularities; ‘theory’ is attractive to neorealists because the latter indicate a commitment to 
positivist science.  Critical constructivist adherents see social constructivism as an “approach”, 
not a theory (Hopf, 2000: 1772) because they deny the worthiness of ‘grand theories’ and that 
their own contribution to the study of world politics constitutes a ‘school’ or even a unified 
theoretical approach (Burchill, 2001: 8).  Others use the term “theory” but interpret it 
differently to neoliberals and neorealists, e.g. Adler argues that constructivism, unlike realism 
and liberalism, is not a theory of politics but “rather, it is a social theory on which 
constructivist theories of international politics – for example, about war, cooperation and 
international community – are based” (1997: 323).  Thus, different strands of constructivism 
are associated with the adoption of either “approach” or “theory”. 
2
 The neorealist accounts of world politics emphasizing ‘structure’ over ‘agency’ tend to draw 
deep distinctions between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ politics, with the interrelationship 
between the two effectively ignored.  Developments in domestic civil society or at the 
individual level are perceived as having little or no meaning at the international level 
(Rengger, 1990: 131).  Neorealism presents hierarchic domestic and anarchic international 
politics as qualitatively different realms that must be studied with logically incompatible 
theoretical frameworks (Donnelly, 2000: 12).   
3
 Although many elites see their task as trying to persuade the public to follow their leaders in 
this respect and track public opinion using private party polls.    
4
 Garret FitzGerald asserts “Irish neutrality is, of course, as the main political parties have 
made clear, military neutrality viz. non participation in a military alliance” (1988: 28).  Only 
Sinn Fein and the Green Party advocate a broader concept of active neutrality.   
5
 Not all fifty categories of verbatim responses are shown or discussed here, mainly the 
categories of responses comparable to Gilland’s supercodes. Little-mentioned or irrelevant 
codes comprise the ‘other’ category.   
6
 Rank order is shown instead of percentages because of differences in the samples and coding 
frames across the surveys. 
7Christine Agius’s social constructivist analysis of Swedish neutrality incorporates discursive 
aspects of identity in arguments concerning the maintenance of a state’s neutrality.  She argues 
active internationalism, as a cornerstone of neutrality practice, constitutes Swedish political 
identity (2006: 156-157).  Anti-neutrality discourses during the Swedish referendum on EU 
membership tried to reinvent national ideals for people to identify with, because neutrality, 
along with other issues, “was still part of the public memory of self” (Aguis, 2006: 159).  
Laurent Goetschel argues that values, interests and identity converge in the concept of 
neutrality because “neutrality has a role as an identity-provider for the population” (1999: 
121).   
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8
 There is also a link between people’s support for alliances and their values and identity: 
“citizen support for alliance structures and international institutions contains a substantial 
“diffuse”, or affective, element that captures their sense of common values and identification 
in addition to assessments of security policy choices (Eichenberg 1989; Risse-Kappen 1991)” 
(Eichenberg, 2000: 171).   
9
 The post-positivist issue is not with the methods used, but the unacknowledged IR theoretical 
assumptions brought to bear on data analysis that effectively exclude post-realist conceptions 
of neutrality and role of the public in constituting neutrality.   
10
 Patriotism/national identity latent variable indicators are separated from the more “negative” 
embodiments of blind nationalism or national superiority: see Thomas Blank et al. (2001) and 
Hurwitz and Peffley (1990: 8).   
11
 The independence indicators are constructed in a binary with deeper EU integration (not 
Jesse’s suggestion of a “British” other) reflecting the importance of European integration for 
the government, academics’ frequent use of EU referendum voting indicators, and the fact that 
elusive concepts such as independence are constructed and sustained in relation to perceived 
binary opposites. 
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